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Abstract 
This analysis considers improvements in productive efficiency that can result from a 
movement from a regulated framework to one that allows for market-based incentives for 
industry participants. Specifically, I look at the case of restructuring in the electricity generation 
industry. As numerous industries and economies have undergone this sort of transition to varying 
degrees, it is instructive to assess the performance of market-based incentives relative to what 
was observed under tighter regulation. Using data from the electricity industry, this analysis 
considers the total effect of restructuring on one input to the production process – labor – as 
reflected in employment levels, payroll per employee and aggregate establishment payroll. Using 
concurrent payroll and employment data from non-utility (“merchant”) and utility generators in 
both restructured and nonrestructured states, I estimate the effect of market liberalization, 
comprising both new entry and state-level legislation, on employment and payroll in this 
industry. I find that merchant owners of divested generation assets employ significantly fewer 
people, but that the payroll per employee is not significantly different from what workers at 
utility-owned plants are paid. As a result, the new merchant owners of these plants have 
significantly lower aggregate payroll expenses. Decomposing the effect into a merchant effect 
and a divestiture effect, I find that merchant ownership is the primary driver of these results.   
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 




   
   
     
                                                 
         
     
 
   
     
I. Industry Restructuring and Productive Efficiency 
Restructuring
1,2 affected a number of regulated industries in the U.S. over the latter part 
of the twentieth century.  Over this time period, airlines, telecommunications, utilities railways 
and trucking transportation underwent significant shifts toward a more liberalized model. 
Internationally, there was a considerable privatization movement that gained momentum in the 
1990s.  As governments and industries continue to consider the benefits of a more market-
oriented system, it is instructive to assess the performance of market incentives in industries that 
have recently undergone the transition. 
The U.S. electric utility industry was a target of restructuring efforts during the 1990s. 
The federal government and individual states sought to lower prices in the industry through the 
introduction of market-based incentives and the relaxation of rules limiting market participants. 
Utilities in many states were living with financial decisions made in the 1970s and 1980s that 
proved ex post to be cost inflating. For example, in the early 1980s, a number of states were 
worried about the energy crisis that had taken place in the previous decade and as a result 
encouraged utilities to sign long-term energy provision arrangements. These arrangements 
effectively locked in the high prices of that time period. In addition, some states had promoted 
the construction of nuclear plants as a response to these high fossil fuel prices.  By the 1990s, 
however, energy prices had shifted substantially again and it was clear that these arrangements 
were no longer cost saving. The federal government and the states began to explore ways to undo 
the damage and prevent these sorts of out-of-market solutions going forward. 
The unbundling of power generation from electricity transmission and distribution was 
one of the ways states encouraged market reform in this sector. Because of concerns of market 
power, some states encouraged or required the incumbent utility to divest itself of generation 
assets. Some utilities voluntarily chose to exit the generation portion of the industry. The 
generation assets were then either purchased by non-utility (“merchant”) firms or transferred to 
unregulated affiliates of the utility, which would function as a separate company. Merchants also 
obtained generation assets by building plants from the ground up. These merchant firms do not 
1 The electricity generation industry, like many other industries we consider “deregulated,” was not truly 
deregulated. While some states have relaxed restrictions on firms, numerous regulations still affect the participants 
in this industry. Thus, I refer to the industry as being “restructured” or “liberalized” throughout this paper. 
2 Restructuring in this industry was achieved through the encouragement of the participation of non-utility 
(merchant) generation ownership as well as through the passage of legislation that introduced market incentives to 
the regulated utilities. This paper will evaluate these restructuring approaches separately.  
 
   
 





   
 
 
   
   
 
 







   
 
                                                 
     
   
have load obligations, so the power that they produce is sold to an electricity distributor, either 
through a formal power market or via bilateral contracts with utilities. Because of such efforts, 
merchants have played an increasingly important role in the generation industry over the last two 
decades. The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze how input decisions, specifically the 
price and quantity of labor, vary according to ownership type and regulatory regime. 
Electricity is an excellent industry in which to study the effects of restructuring. From an 
analytical perspective, one reason for its attractiveness is that identification of its effects is 
plausible because restructuring legislation was largely enacted on a state-by-state basis. Not all 
states passed this type of legislation, and the states that did restructure did not do so 
simultaneously.  Additionally, merchant penetration varies over time and by state. Divestitures of 
utility plants to merchant owners also did not occur at once, and construction of new plants by 
merchants took place throughout the sample period.  By using concurrent payroll and 
employment data from both merchant and utility generators in both restructured and 
nonrestructured states over a period of several years, I can estimate the effect of market 
liberalization, comprising both new entry and legislation, on employees in this industry. The 
geographic and chronological nature of the evolution of the industry allows me to exploit both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in the data. 
Another useful characteristic of power plants is that their physical locations are fixed. If 
there is, for example, an unfavorable change in regulatory status, the plant cannot simply be 
moved to another location with more favorable conditions. This means that individual plants 
cannot easily select into or out of treatment groups. Additionally, homogeneity of output makes 
comparison of generation plants more straightforward, as there is no need to adjust for quality or 
other unobserved differences in the output. 
Why would merchant plants have enhanced incentives to cost-minimize relative to 
regulated utilities?
3 Regulated utilities come from a long tradition of cost recovery in which rates 
are based on the actual costs incurred by the firms (plus a rate of return). This means that 
regulated utilities have generally been able to recover prudently-incurred costs. Any savings 
achieved by the utility would be temporary; at the next rate hearing the regulators would base the 
rates on the lowered costs, thus muting the benefit of the cost savings. Some incentive-based 
3 See also Bailey (1986) for evidence of post-deregulation cost minimization in the telecommunications, passenger 
air transport and freight transport industries.  She further finds evidence that labor exhibited productivity 
improvements in each of these industries. 
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plans have been introduced more recently, but cost-of-service or rate-of-return legislation has 
historically been the dominant form of regulation in this industry.
4 
Indeed, the goal of regulation is typically to limit rents, not to encourage productive 
efficiency. Historically, there has been little downside of exceeding minimal cost. Since the 
determination of rates has generally been based on incurred costs, the upside of cost 
minimization has been small as well. Moreover, because of political considerations, labor is an 
area in which regulators have not been likely to challenge costs. Until fairly recently, unions 
were pervasive in this industry and even today the unionization rate in electricity is over double 
that of the economy as a whole,
5 which is either a source or a sign of labor’s strength in the 
industry. 
Looking at the establishment-level data, it is clear that the owners of power plants 
responded to the differential incentives implied by merchant ownership. There are three key facts 
that emerge from the analysis of plant-level employment and payroll data. First, after controlling 
for plant characteristics, employment at plants that are merchant either by birth or by divestiture 
is significantly and substantially lower than employment at utility firms.  Second, the merchant 
plants’ total payroll costs are lower. Third, payroll per employee at divested plants is not 
distinguishable from payroll per employee at non-divested plants, while native merchant plants 
have significantly higher payroll per employee costs than utility plants. All three findings are 
consistent with what I was told by industry management and union representatives, who said that 
in California merchants eliminated approximately 40% of the work force after the transfer of 
ownership, while wages have kept pace with the existing wage trend. Moreover, it was noted that 
merchants have broadened job descriptions considerably and have largely eliminated the 
apprenticeship programs that were previously the primary source of new skilled labor.
6 These 
practices would lead to higher payroll costs per employee, even if wages by occupation were 
unchanged. Of course, it is far too early to judge whether eliminating the practice of on-the-job­
training will prove to be optimal for the continued provision of an adequately skilled labor force. 
4 See Comnes, Stoft, Greene and Hill (1995) for a description of historical and pilot performance-based regulation in 
this industry. 
5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Career Guide to Industries 2006-07, p. 95. 
6 Anecdotally, it seems that the decommissioning of military bases has aided this to some extent. Every military base 
is required to have its own independent power source. As bases close or individuals retire, merchant companies can 
hire fully-trained power plant employees that received their training on the dime of the U.S. government, allowing 
them to eliminate some of the workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
3
      




   
   
 






   
   
 
   
   
   
 
                                                 
   
The aggregate data in this analysis cannot be used to examine wage distribution, but it is 
conceivable that microdata would support this assessment. 
In this analysis, I focus on merchant and utility differences in the choice of labor inputs. 
The alternative approach is to estimate a production function, which would more directly address 
the question of whether employment and aggregate labor costs decreased due to generators 
substituting capital or materials for labor. However, because of data availability issues
7 this is not 
a feasible approach. For the following reasons, substitution of labor is not likely to be the 
complete explanation for the results presented here. There are four categories of inputs to 
electricity generation: fuel, capital, materials and labor. Electricity generation is a fuel-intensive 
process; from a technical perspective, firms have very limited ability to decrease employment by 
using more fuel. Regarding the potential for capital-labor substitution, the vast majority of 
capital expenses are incurred at the time of construction of the plant. There could be a shift in the 
labor-capital mix upon conception and construction of a new plant, but it is hard to alter capital 
decisions in a substantial way once the plant has been built.
8 Since I am looking at labor 
decisions within a plant, capital is essentially fixed and therefore there is limited opportunity for 
substitution.  Finally, there is the possibility that materials could substitute for labor. Fabrizio, 
Wolfram and Rose (2006) find that both employment and non-fuel expenses (which include 
labor costs) are lower at legislatively-restructured plants. On a percentage basis, non-fuel 
expenses have fallen in excess of employment declines, indicating that true efficiencies have 
occurred in this industry. 
In this paper, I use three separate but related markers of liberalization to analyze how 
generators are changing their employment practices. First, I look at plants that were divested 
from utility ownership as compared to native merchant plants and utility plants that were not 
divested. The post-divestiture owners are either merchant firms or they are unregulated affiliates 
of the utilities. The advantage of looking at this group is that it is a very strong identification 
strategy – I can look at plants over time that have changed only with respect to ownership type. 
On the other hand, plants that are merchants as a result of divestiture may be quite different from 
plants that were constructed as merchant plants. Since new plants continue to be built, it is useful 
to consider whether the plants built by utilities and merchants have inherent operational 
7 While financial and operational data are widely available for utility plants, merchant plants are not required to
 
publicly disclose these data. 

8 See also Fabrizio, Wolfram and Rose (2006). 
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differences.  Consequently, I also look more broadly at the effect of all types of merchant 
ownership on plant operations. Here, I compare divested plants and plants that were constructed 
by merchant firms to plants that are utility-owned throughout the sample. The third category is 
the set of plants that operate in states that enacted state-specific restructuring legislation in 
addition to the federal initiatives that affected all states. These plants are compared to plants in 
nonrestructured states to determine the effect of legislation on operations.  
Both the regressions that focus on divested plants and those that explore employment at 
native merchant plants show a strong negative employment effect of merchant ownership. The 
range of the estimated effect is 30% to 70%, after controlling for plant characteristics, either 
through plant fixed effects or using descriptive attributes of the plants. The equations that 
consider the payroll per employee show that average pay at divested plants is not different from 
nondivested plants. The regressions that identify a merchant effect, however, indicate that while 
divested plants may have higher payroll per employee than utility plants, they have lower payroll 
per employee than native merchant plants.  Considering the net of the negative employment 
effect and the positive payroll per employee effect, the establishment-level payroll equations 
demonstrate that there are real differences in the labor practices at merchant and utility power 
plants. The divested plants show a large and significant decrease in total payroll, as do the 
regressions that identify an effect based on plant characteristics.  Again, when separating the 
effect of divestiture from the effect of merchant ownership, I find that the vast majority of the 
downward pressure on payroll is due to merchant ownership. This suggests that building new 
merchant capacity may be as effective, or even more effective, than divestiture as a way to 
encourage productive efficiency in this industry. This is an important point to keep in mind as 
new power plants are built to meet expanding electricity demand. 
This study uses plant-level annual employment and payroll data. These data allow me to 
look at the effect of changes in ownership and state-level regulatory legislation at individual 
plants. I use two approaches to consider the effect of ownership. First, I consider the effect of a 
discrete change in ownership on operating decisions, that is, divestiture of the asset to a merchant 
firm. Then, I analyze whether plants with either native or divestiture-derived merchant 
ownership are different from other plants. Results of both approaches suggest significant 
differences in labor practices at merchant firms that are consistent with a greater incentive to 
cost-minimize at merchant plants. Separating these two types of merchant plants, I find that 
5
  
   
   
   
   
 
 
   





   
   
 
   
 
 
      
                                                 
   
merchant ownership is a far more important determinant of the merchant/utility differential than 
is divestiture. Divested plants provided essentially no more opportunity for improving cost 
efficiency than native merchant plants, and it may actually be more difficult to reduce costs at 
these plants. 
This dataset is unique in that it includes both utility and merchant power plants and 
contains observations both before and after legislation and ownership changes. Both utility-
owned and merchant-owned plants are required to submit detailed operations and financial data 
to regulatory entities such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). However, because in many cases only the utility data 
are considered non-proprietary, previous studies such as Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (FRW 
2006) have focused on the behavior of utility plants when presented with a changed regulatory 
environment. Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) look at efficiency gains in both merchant and utility 
plants. In contrast to this analysis, they focus on the physical efficiency of plant operations, 
rather than examining employment data. 
II. Objectives and Background 
A. The Electricity Generation Industry 
This paper analyzes whether merchants behave as though their incentives to cost-
minimize are stronger than those of utilities and whether state-level legislation has encouraged 
firms to cost-minimize beyond this. All generators decreased employment over the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, but did they do so differentially according to ownership type or as a result of a 
change in regulatory regime? 
Regulators, industry participants and union leaders have all indicated that a primary goal 
of restructuring was to reduce costs in states that had higher-than-average retail rates. Union 
leaders were “reluctant” to support market liberalization and “would have been happier if none 
of this [restructuring] happened” because of the anticipated negative impact on employment in 
the industry.
9  Independent industry employment forecasts have predicted that this industry 
should expect a continued decline in employment. At the same time, it has been noted that 
9 “How Labor Built Up Its Energy Clout in California,” The Electricity Daily, Vol. 12, No. 120, June 23, 1999. 
6
  
   
     
   
 
 
     
   
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
     
  
   
   
                                                 
     
 
   
   
professionals with a high level of technical expertise should face generally favorable job 
prospects, with continued strong demand for their skill sets.
 10 
This is consistent with the theory that under regulation, labor was indeed able to capture 
significant rents in this industry.
11 Here, I examine whether restructuring was accompanied by an 
erosion of these rents. If so, were rents reduced through wage changes, through reductions in the 
workforce or through some combination of the two? 
In this analysis, I measure changes in labor costs (which is a function of both wages and 
the number of employees) in the various groups of interest to examine how labor’s position has 
changed under a more competitive system.  I expect to find that because in a competitive 
environment the firm is the residual claimant on profits, labor has less power to extract rents in 
the merchant framework.  Additionally, state-level legislation was designed to allow utilities to 
benefit similarly from reduced expenditures, so it is expected that labor has also become less 
powerful in these states. This is in contrast to the traditional regulated regime, in which firms are 
generally able to pass through labor costs via higher rates.  Labor, in particular, is a relatively 
uncontroversial cost element of this industry. Meanwhile, the cost of a strike is potentially quite 
high as it could lead to service interruptions that could conceivably jeopardize the entire system. 
As a result, there was perhaps even less pressure to economize in this area of operations.  
Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, there is an incentive in the short term to 
reduce labor costs to take advantage of regulatory lag; however, this incentive is dampened by 
the fact that rates will at some point be reset using the lowered costs.  Regulated utilities 
typically propose their operating costs for some period of time; regulators approve rates that are 
based on these costs (plus a specified return). Rates are reset periodically. Thus, regulated firms 
are able to pass labor costs through to customers and in the long term do not have a strong 
incentive to cut costs.
12 
By contrast, in either a legislatively-restructured or merchant environment, firms are the 
residual claimants in perpetuity on any cost savings they are able to achieve. Output prices are no 
longer explicitly determined by production costs, so any cost savings will be a direct 




11 See, e.g., Rose (1987) and Hendricks (1975, 1977). 

12 In the short term, however, reducing costs can increase margins due to regulatory lag. The firm is the residual
 
claimant on savings achieved after costs have been approved. However, these lower costs will be considered in
 




   
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
 






   
     
 
 
   
 
   
                                                 
       
 
     
improvement to the firm’s financial situation. Utilities that pass generation ownership to their 
unregulated subsidiaries have incentives that are similar to those of merchant plants.  
Utility plants also have an incentive to become more efficient in a restructured 
environment, as they must now compete with the merchant generators for dispatch priority, 
which is typically based on generation costs. Moreover, merchant generators have pulled back 
the curtain on the industry to some extent. Merchant plants that locate in a utility’s service 
territory provide a useful benchmark for utility plants with similar characteristics. In this way, 
cost improvements and efficiencies implemented by merchant plants are likely to eventually 
filter through to utility plants, assuming that the lower costs are sustainable in the long term.  
Utility plants in states that were not restructured, on the other hand, have somewhat 
different incentives. Because in such states the utility itself decides how to dispatch electricity, 
they do not have to worry about dispatch priority or prices set by the market. They can largely 
choose whether to buy power from merchant plants and do so through bilateral contracts only 
when it is to their own advantage. At the same time, the threat of restructuring may have affected 
the utility’s incentive to engage in cost-cutting proactively in an attempt to convince regulators 
that there was no cause to restructure the market. Comparing the merchant plants to utility plants, 
and comparing plants in restructured states to plants in nonrestructured states is appealing from a 
practical perspective. However, it fails to measure the extent to which even nonrestructured 
states and utility plants were affected by the change in the regulatory environment in neighboring 
jurisdictions. While I do not attempt to measure how the threat of restructuring in all states 
contributed to the reduction in employment and payroll at all plants, it is likely that all plants 
were affected by the prevailing mood during this time period. 
Total electricity generation employment in 2003 was almost 250,000 people (both full 
and part-time; all classes of ownership). This reflects a significant reduction from 1990 levels, 
when employment in this industry was a bit over 350,000.
13 At the same time, the industry has 
expanded output, rising from just over 3 billion megawatt-hours (MWh) of output to just under 4 
billion MWh nationwide. It is also an economically important industry; in 2004, the wholesale 
value of electricity in the U.S. was over $150 billion.
14 But beyond simply being a study of what 




14 According to EIA data, the national average wholesale price of electricity was $39.40 per megawatt-hour. In the 

same year, net electricity generation approached 4 billion megawatt-hours. 
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happened in electricity generation, the findings can provide insight into how these incentive 
changes affect the real-world decisions of the affected firms. This industry provides an important 
data point when considering the realistic outcomes of these types of shifts in market structure. 
A brief look at the publicly available state-level data indicates that average wages for 
generation workers have increased in excess of inflation over the period 1990-2003. Moreover, 
wages have increased somewhat more rapidly in restructured states. Figure 1, which was 
constructed using aggregated data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW), illustrates the change in the industry average annual wage, calculated as (deflated) 
payroll divided by average annual employment. From the graph, it is evident that workers in this 
industry are seeing their wages rise, even after accounting for inflation. 
Concurrent with the dramatic decrease in employment in the industry was a continued 
expansion of capacity and output. Using employees per megawatt (MW) capacity as a measure 
of productivity, Figure 2 shows that plants in legislatively-restructured states have decreased this 
ratio (improved productivity) by about 53%, while the decrease in nonrestructured states was 
somewhat less dramatic – there was a 46% decrease from 1990-2003.
15 The effects of merchant 
entry and enhanced market incentives on industry-wide employment have not been well-studied 
and are worth exploring in conjunction with wage effects to arrive at a more complete 
understanding of the effects of liberalization programs. 
What is the dollar value of the savings that generators have been able to achieve? 
Industry payroll
16 in 1990, expressed in 2004 dollars, was approximately $18.8 billion. Industry 
payroll in 2004 was $14.4 billion. Meanwhile, industry production and capacity expanded 
considerably over this time period. In 1990, the electricity industry had payroll costs of 
approximately $6.19 per megawatt-hour (MWh), in 2004 dollars. Multiplying this by the actual 
2004 output implies a total payroll cost of $24.6 billion. Thus, correcting for output differences, 
the industry’s payroll expenses in 1990 were 71% higher than they were in 2004. In dollar terms, 
this is a savings of over $10 billion. Performing a similar calculation using industry capacity in 
place of output yields a similar conclusion – payroll costs would have been approximately 72% 
15 Employment data are from the QCEW. MW capacity and MWh generation data are from Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/generation_state.xls 
16 This is an approximation based on total employment in the electricity generation industry times the average 
weekly production wage times 52. Data are taken from the Current Employment Statistics survey; national data 










    









   
   
   
                                                 
 
higher if 1990 employment-capacity ratios had been in effect in 2004.
 17 This simple calculation, 
while not definitive, does suggest that the issue merits further attention. This paper will consider 
the influence restructuring had on employment, controlling for plant characteristics. I specifically 
focus on the effect of the shift from utility to competitive ownership of power plants. 
B. Prior Literature 
This paper fits into the literature on regulatory rents, productive efficiency and firm 
privatization. A number of authors have addressed these issues in various industries, with the 
general conclusion that restructuring or an increase in competitive pressure is accompanied by 
efficiency gains that are sometimes quite large. 
Specifically, Rose (1987) discusses regulatory rents in the trucking industry, which was 
deregulated in the 1970s. She does this by considering wages in the industry and finds that in the 
regulated era union members were able to capture a significant share of regulatory rents. Upon 
deregulation, these rents were dissipated.  
In contrast to Rose’s findings, Card (1986, 1996) finds little evidence that employees 
capture significant regulatory rents. He concludes this after examining the experience of the 
airline industry, examining the evolution of wages, while controlling for job titles. 
Hendricks’ (1975) work on firm incentives in labor negotiations with unions indicates 
that wages are decreasing in firm profitability. Hendricks (1977) further finds that regulated 
industries have, on average, lower wages than unregulated industries. He does not, however, 
consider employment or aggregate payroll expenses in his analyses, focusing on the price rather 
than the quantity of labor employed. It is difficult to assess the conclusions about occupation-
controlled wages with the establishment-level payroll data available in this paper. 
Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2006) consider the response of utility electricity generators 
to changing legislative incentives in this industry. They find that plants in states that enacted 
restructuring legislation reduced employment and nonfuel operating expenses. The efficiency 
improvements they identify are modest, but do indicate that markets provide enhanced incentives 
for power plants to find ways to become more efficient. Because they use publicly-available 
data, they focus on utilities in their analysis rather than on competitive generators. 
17 Output and capacity data taken from the Annual Energy Review 2005, Energy Information Administration 





       
   
 
 
   











   
 
 
     
 
 
Olley and Pakes (1996) look at the effect of deregulation on productivity in the 
telecommunications equipment industry. Although they take quite a different approach, the 
conclusion of their analysis also supports the theory that deregulation encourages firms to behave 
more efficiently. In particular, they find evidence of improvements in allocative efficiency across 
plants engaged in equipment production. 
In addition to the literature on the relationship between efficiency and market 
liberalization, there is a significant literature on the relationship between productive efficiency 
and firm profits. Borenstein and Farrell (2007) find empirically that there is a concave 
relationship the market value of gold mining companies and the price of gold. This suggests that 
in this industry firms become less efficient (“fatter”) as the wealth of the company increases. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that experience less pressure to improve profits 
do not cost minimize.   
Along these lines, Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002) consider improvements in labor 
productivity that occurred among iron ore producers in the 1980s that faced falling prices. They 
point out that the iron ore mines located in regions of faltering steel production faced increased 
competitive pressure relative to those located near thriving mines. An additional source of 
competitive pressure that was more directly under the mine’s control was production costs. In the 
face of near-doom, these at-risk mines experienced remarkable productivity improvements of 50 
to 100%. 
Papers on privatization of formerly state owned and operated enterprises have largely 
found that privately-owned companies exhibit improved productivity. While most utilities are 
not state-owned, it is conceivable that tightly regulated output prices provide some of the same 
efficiency incentives. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an excellent evaluation and survey 
of the progress and conclusions of the privatization literature.  Most of the studies they cite agree 
with the conclusion of this paper that competitive (private) firms have higher productivity than 
regulated (state-owned) firms, sometimes much higher. 
C. Restructuring Timeline and Specifics  
In the context of the electricity industry, restructuring can take place at the level of 
generation, transmission or distribution.  Of these different levels, that of the generation industry 
has progressed the furthest from a national perspective. This is because it is widely believed that 
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electricity generation is unlikely to be a natural monopoly.
18 It is easy to argue that there is little 
use in building two sets of transmission lines to transport electricity over long distances. 
Likewise, there is probably no reason to run more than one set of the distribution wires that 
connect the transmission backbone to individual homes. Generation facilities, however, are 
different. Once transmission and distribution is established, energy can (for the most part) be 
delivered to and from any point on the grid. Moreover, energy needs are expanding over time 
and new power plants continue to be built. A large number of plants are necessary in order to 
provide the electricity demanded by consumers.  The competitive process can help eliminate 
inefficiencies that may arise from full-scale regulation.  
The liberalization of the electricity generation industry began in earnest with the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992.
19  This legislation opened the sector to nonutility (merchant) provision of 
wholesale power at the national level, by encouraging merchant ownership of generation assets 
and allowing access to the transmission network on a case-by-case basis.  In 1996, FERC Order 
888 continued the push toward a more competitive generation market by requiring utilities to 
provide open access to transmission lines at nondiscriminatory rates. The restructuring of the 
industry and the establishment of competitive generation markets have been accompanied by the 
sale of utility-owned plants to merchant generators (divestiture), by the transfer of regulated 
utility assets to unregulated affiliates and by the construction of new plants.
20 As a result, the 
proportion of electricity provided by merchant generators increased markedly over the decade of 
the 1990s.
21 As shown in Table 1, less than 6% of total capacity was owned by non-utilities in 
1990. By 2003, this proportion had increased to over 43%. The state-level restructuring programs 
of the 1990s catalyzed merchant participation in the industry; merchant ownership started to 
increase rapidly in 1998, around the time that the first restructuring programs were implemented 
18 See, e.g., Christensen and Greene (1976), who fail to find evidence of significant economies of scale at the firm 
level in electricity generation above a moderate level of output. More specifically, introducing more firms to the 
generation industry does not materially compromise firm efficiency relative to a market consisting of very few large 
firms. 
19 Although merchant generation existed prior to this, it was on a much smaller scale and was largely controlled by 
the transmission owners (incumbent utilities). 
20 As part of their restructuring programs, many states required utilities to divest their generation assets.  There were 
voluntary divestitures as well. 
21 As of 2000, South Dakota was the only state that had no non-utility generation (NUG) facilities; by 2003, even 
South Dakota had a small merchant presence.  Although all states currently have merchant (non-utility) generation, 
the percent of capacity owned by merchant generators varies widely from state to state. 
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and coincident with the first set of plant divestitures.  Clearly, merchant generators are important 
players in the industry and are increasing their activities apace. 
In 1993, the first state – New York – held restructuring hearings. By the close of the 
millennium, every state had instituted formal hearings to consider whether to restructure. 
Currently, almost half of all states have restructured their electricity markets to some extent, 
although in response to the rolling blackouts and price spikes in California during 2000 and 
2001, some of these states have since suspended or delayed restructuring activity pending further 
review.
22 The movement to liberalize this industry persists today, as some states continue to 
monitor industry conditions as part of the ongoing debate regarding whether to move to a more 
deregulated model. 
III. Employment Data and Plant Descriptive Data 
A. Plant-Level Employment Data 
This study uses data from state unemployment insurance programs, as compiled by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) through what is also known as ES-202 data.  The data cover the 
time period 1990-2004 and include quarterly employment and payroll at the establishment 
(power plant) level. These data are then aggregated to the annual level to match data on plant 
characteristics and production that is collected by the EIA. In the BLS data, establishments are 
tracked over time using a BLS-generated identification number that is unique to the 
establishment across years. This number is unique to the establishment rather than unique to the 
owner of the establishment.   
Unfortunately, this dataset only covers direct employees. Contract employees are 
reported under the firm that is the direct employer, i.e., the entity that provides the employee’s 
paycheck. This is a limitation of the dataset, but it is not likely that it is the sole explanation for 
the results presented here. I discuss this issue in more depth after the description of BLS data. 
The unemployment data are the foundation for the Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, which is also available publicly at the state and national levels from the BLS website. 
22 Restructured states are: AZ, CT, DE, IL, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, VA, plus DC. 
Restructuring has been delayed in: AR, MT, NV, NM and OK.  CA has suspended restructuring.  Source: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html, data as of Feb. 2003.  AR and NM ultimately 
repealed restructuring legislation. 
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According to BLS documentation, this data source covers the vast majority – 97.1% – of non­
farm employment.
23 
The unemployment data include establishment-level monthly payroll and employee 
counts. There is no differentiation between full-time and part-time employees, so the monthly 
data exceeds the number of full-time equivalent employees to the extent that workers are part-
time. Anecdotally, I have found no indication that there has been a shift toward or away from 
full-time employment in this industry. Establishments report earnings for all employees that fall 
under the unemployment insurance program. Detailed determinations of which employees are 
covered by the program vary by state, but as noted above the vast majority of employees fall 
under this system. 
Projects that make use of the confidential BLS microdata undergo two levels of approval. 
At the top level, the BLS evaluates the proposal. Once the project is approved, it must be 
approved by each state that provides the microdata. States have varying data sharing 
arrangements with the BLS. Some states allow access to all BLS-approved researchers; others do 
not allow access to any outside researchers. The remaining states grant approval on a case-by­
case basis. For this reason, I do not have access to data for all states; there are currently 31 states 
in my sample.
24  This number could grow as additional state-level agreements are reached.
25 
The unemployment data are organized by 6-digit North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) codes. In theory, this means that establishments are classified at the level of 
generation type in the BLS data.
26 However, examining the microdata reveals that establishments 
frequently misreport their NAICS codes. For example, an establishment called “John Doe 
Nuclear Plant” might appear in the data under a NAICS code that designates it as a hydroelectric 
plant. If there is indeed a nuclear plant with that name in the EIA dataset, I assume that this is an 
establishment that is incorrectly classified and that it is actually a nuclear plant. To deal with 
these misclassifications on a formal basis, I use a manual technique to match the plants in the 
BLS dataset to the plants in the EIA database. Plants are matched using BLS data that detail 
23 Source: http://www.bls.gov/cew/cewbultn.htm, viewed Aug 23, 2006. 

24 The states in the sample are; AK, AR, AZ, CA, DE, GA, IA, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MD, MN, MO, MS, MT, NC, 

ND, NE, NJ, NM, NV, OK, RI, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI. See footnote 17 for the regulation status of these states. 

25 These data are housed at BLS headquarters in Washington, DC, where all data analysis was conducted. 

26 221111, for example, corresponds to “Hydroelectric Power Generation.” 
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company name, trade name, address, NAICS code, number of employees and aggregated 
payroll.
27 
Ultimately, I was able to identify 273 gas-fired
28 plants in the sample, out of the universe 
of 1,443 plants of this type that existed in 2002. Based on the fact that the average capacity of the 
plants in my sample is larger than the average capacity of the universe of gas plants, the plants 
that I could not identify tend to be the smaller gas plants. Although the plants that I have 
matched do not represent a census of plants, I am confident that I have correctly identified the 
plants for this subset. Given the irregularity of the data, I am more comfortable with a relatively 
small number of confident matches than with a plant census that requires a great deal of 
assumptions. Based on my experience with the microdata, I do not believe matching every plant 
in the two databases is feasible.  
B. Plant-Level Descriptive Data 
Data from the EIA
29 provide information on the characteristics of individual plants, such 
as merchant status, capacity, the year the plant started operation and the type of fuel used by the 
plant. The Electric Power Monthly, published by the EIA, details changes in plant ownership for 
this time period. I consider a plant to be divested as of the year the change in ownership went 
into effect.  
Power plants can be fueled by a number of different sources. The categories of fuels used 
in generation are nuclear, coal, gas, water and other.
30  For the present analysis, I consider only 
gas-fired plants. Nuclear, hydro and “other” plants have clearly different operations patterns 
from fossil fuel plants. Nuclear plants have extensive safety regulations that affect employment. 
On a very practical note, my sample only contains one divested nuclear plant and so this is not 
currently a feasible area of research.  Hydro plants tend to be very small and have traditionally 
been sparsely staffed. Plants that fall in the “other” category cover a wide range of plants and 
tend to rely on less mature technology. 
27 As the data collection processes are completely separate and the data are reported by individual establishments 
over a period of years, there is no guarantee that company names and addresses will be represented the same way in 
both the BLS and EIA databases. As a result, I hand-matched the establishments in the unemployment data 
according to state, city, company or trade name and address. Often the match was straightforward – if the plant was 
called “ABC Power Plant” (either company name or trade name) in the BLS data I considered that a match to “ABC 
Power Plant” in the EIA data (assuming the city and state also matched), regardless of NAICS classification in the 
BLS data. 
28 For reasons discussed below I focus on gas plants for this analysis. 
29 EIA Form 860a and 860b, obtained through Platts POWERdat, version 8.1.0804. 













   
 
   
   
 
 
     
   
 
 
     
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
Because state utilities commissions tended to encourage the divestiture of fossil fuel 
plants, their numbers are more plentiful. For this analysis, I focus on natural gas-fired plants. 
These plants make up a significant portion of overall portfolio by capacity.
31 Moreover, 
merchants tended to build gas plants and it was the single largest category of divested plants on 
the basis of the percent of capacity divested, with 28% of the total capacity of natural gas-fired 
plants divested or slated for divestiture as of 1999.
32 Since these plants comprise a significant 
portion of the overall plant base and also of the divested plant base, are a relatively well-
understood technology, and are less subject to continued regulatory oversight, they are a 
reasonable focus of research. The analysis was also conducted with coal plants, but there were 
not enough divested or native merchant coal plants in the sample to obtain significant results 
(although the sign of the results was broadly consistent with the sign of the results using natural 
gas plants). 
For a subset of years, I have data on the annual production of the plants, measured in 
megawatt-hours.
33 These data are available for both utility and merchant plants from 1995 
through 2004. In theory, since production varies on an annual basis, this measure of output may 
be useful in addition to plant fixed effects. However, I do not find that accounting for 
fluctuations in plant usage over time changes the analysis in a substantive way. This is not 
surprising, as staffing decisions are likely made based on capacity and long-term production 
plans as much as on short-term output variation. For a normal range of operation (i.e., the plant is 
not shut down or on standby), employment is somewhat fixed.  A plant operator needs to be 
present whether the plant is running at 50% of capacity or at 75% of capacity. Maintenance 
employment may differ somewhat if the plant is run particularly intensively, but again, looking 
at the issue empirically, when production data are included the results are essentially the same as 
when they are omitted. Furthermore, the plants in my study tend to be baseload plants, so their 
output does not vary dramatically. 
I follow Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2006) in defining a dichotomous variable for the 
status of restructuring legislation. States chose whether or not to restructure their electricity 
industries beyond the federal efforts that paved the way for merchant entry, and each did so on 




32Energy Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1999: Mergers and 

other Corporate Combinations (December 1999). For comparison, 15% of total coal capacity was divested. 





   




     
 
   
   
     
   
 
    
 
   
 




                                                 
     
 
 




their own timetable. States either chose to pass a law authorizing competitive markets or chose to 
maintain the status quo of centrally-set electricity rates. Since legislation was universally 
preceded by a formal state-level hearing, I take the start of formal hearings as the incipiency of 
state-level restructuring.  The delay between hearings and the enactment of legislation was often 
quite lengthy, so it is useful to consider the time period between hearings and legislation as a 
time that the utilities were aware of impending changes and some actions taken in this period 
were undoubtedly anticipatory. Although this definition requires a level of foresight on the part 
of the utilities, they were active participants in restructuring hearings and it is reasonable to 
expect that they had a fair idea of the outcome of the process. Additionally, while restructuring 
decisions were correlated with electricity costs in the individual states, employment is a 
relatively small part of generation expenses. As a result, it is difficult to credibly claim that 
redundant or inefficient employment was a driver in state-level restructuring. 
C. Potential Selection of Divested Plants 
A natural question that arises is whether the plants that were divested suffer from a 
selection or pre-existing trend issue. That is, would the plants have reduced employment costs in 
the absence of divestiture? Were the plants that were divested non-random, e.g., chosen because 
they had the most potential for efficiency gains? 
States approached the issue of divestiture in different ways. At a broad level, some states 
were very concerned about the potential for utilities to exercise market power. These states 
mandated divestiture, but did so in different ways. Some states mandated that all plants with 
certain characteristics be sold; others said that utilities must divest themselves of a certain 
proportion of their generation assets. Divestitures also occurred separately from restructuring, as 
firms or municipalities decided to exit the generation market entirely. It is also possible that 
some utilities divested selected plants strategically; this possibility is discussed further below.
34 
Between 1998 and 2002, 339 plants
35 were divested in 24 states plus the District of 
Columbia.
36 Most of these divestitures occurred in states that had enacted restructuring. 
34 For more discussion of reasons firms divested their generation assets see Energy Information Administration, The
 
Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1999: Mergers and Other Corporate Combinations, Section 6:
 
“Divestiture of Generation Assets by Investor-Owned Electric Utilities,” December 1999. 

35 Excluding bulk hydro sales. Data are from the Electric Power Monthly released by the EIA over the period 1998 ­
2003. 

36 The majority of divestitures that have taken place occurred during this time period. Although there were a few 

divestitures that took place in 2003 or 2004, these were not included in this analysis because of a lack of post-







   
 










     
 
   
 
                                                 
However, there were some states that experienced divestiture even though no restructuring took 
place.
37  By contrast, of the 18 states, including DC, that restructured (and did not subsequently 
suspend or delay the process), utilities in 15 states ultimately divested at least some generation 
assets. The reasons for divesting were myriad – a mixture of mandated sale, “encouragement” to 
sell, strategic sales and disintegration of the supply chain. 
The concern of selection bias is greatest in those cases in which the utilities were allowed 
to choose which of their plants were to be sold to a merchant owner. If this were the case, the 
utilities could have chosen to divest only those plants that were already reducing employment, 
meaning that ownership transfer could have coincided with changes that were happening at the 
plant independently of divestiture.  To begin to address this issue, it is useful to think about the 
incentives of the utility. Consider a plant that had leaner operating costs; it would be a more 
attractive investment for merchant firms and would therefore fetch a higher price upon sale. It is 
possible, then, that utilities did some cost cutting in advance of divestiture. These cost 
efficiencies would still be attributable to divestiture. On the other hand, it may be that utilities 
divested the plants that had the greatest potential for improvement, selling them as “fixer­
uppers.” Either way, it is important to consider which plants were ultimately divested to 
determine whether sample selection is a serious issue for this analysis.  
Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) show that in practice the utilities that divested generation 
tended to divest all or nearly all of their assets rather than selectively retaining plants. For the set 
of states included in the present sample that had divestitures of at least 500 MW, the percent of 
coal and gas capacity owned by independent power producers is shown in Table 2. For three of 
the states in my sample with significant divestitures, 90% or more of the capacity is owned by 
merchants, supporting the “all or nothing” claim of non-selective divestiture. There are, however, 
a few exceptions that would benefit from some explanation. Indiana and Kentucky had 
divestitures that resulted from the sale of the portfolio of assets of utilities that primarily served 
another state. Louisiana’s divestitures were the result of a single utility selling both of its power 
plants. Texas experienced two types of divestitures in this period. First, all of the assets 
controlled by Central Power and Light and West Texas Utilities Company were transferred to 
AEP (a merchant firm) as the result of a corporate merger. Second, Texas Utilities Electric 
37 States that had divestitures but did not restructure were: AK (1 plant), FL (1 plant), IN (2 plants), KY (5 plants), 
LA (2 plants) and WV (1 plant). 
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Company transferred all of its generation assets to an unregulated subsidiary. Based on these 
facts, it is unlikely that strategic divestiture was widespread during this period.  
D. Plants in Sample vs. Plant Universe 
It is possible that the plants in my sample differ systematically from the plant universe in 
a way that might bias the results of this analysis. Here, I present characteristics of the plants that 
are in my sample and compare them to the full sample of plants. Table 3 presents summary 
characteristics for the plants in my sample.  
In the universe of U.S. power plants as of 2004, 18% (by count) were gas-fired.  When 
considering the plants by capacity, however, gas plants comprise about 24.4% of total capacity, 
indicating that they tend to be larger by capacity in comparison to other fuel types.
38 
The observations that are included in the BLS data tend to describe gas plants that are 
both larger and older than typical.
39 It is sensible that larger plants are easier to spot in the data – 
they are much less likely to be reported under another establishment. It is possible that larger 
plants had more latitude for efficiency improvements, but this does not detract from the results of 
the study. 
IV. Estimating the Effects of Legislation, Divestiture and Merchant Ownership 
There are three main components to this analysis. First, I look at the effect of 
restructuring and merchant ownership on staffing levels, using end-of-year employment counts. 
Next, I divide annual establishment payroll by average employment over the year to evaluate the 
change in the annual payroll per employee by establishment.
40 Finally, I consider changes in total 
annual payroll by establishment.  The basic approach is common across all three of these 
measures of the price or quantity of an establishment’s labor inputs. 
Note that I have two dependent variables that are directly reported in the data and I have 
constructed a third.  I consider the three separately for two reasons. First, by looking at all three 
variables separately it is straightforward to assess the separate and combined effects of staffing 
and pay decisions.  Second, the payroll variable contains annual establishment-level data. Thus, 
38Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual, 2004. 
39 In 2004, the average nameplate capacity for gas plants in the EIA database (plant universe) was 283 MW. This is 
smaller than the average size of 361 MW for gas plants in the BLS sample for that year. Mean plant age in the BLS 
sample is 27 years, while it is 23 years for the EIA gas plants. 
40 I also ran a regression that regressed (log) payroll on (log) employment (plus other variables). The coefficient on 
employment was consistently very close to one, indicating that using the payroll per employee as the dependent 
variable is not an unreasonable approach. 
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it would be inappropriate to divide payroll by end-of-year employment
41 to arrive at a measure of 
employee-level costs. While the three variables are clearly related, the payroll per employee 
measure is not precisely a transformation of the observations on employment and payroll. For 
these reasons, all three regression results are reported. 
Each of the three measures of labor inputs is analyzed in two ways. The first set of 
regressions uses plant fixed effects to control for individual plant characteristics that are 
unobservable or idiosyncratic. While this is the best way to control for variation at the plant 
level, it is useful only for identifying a divestiture effect. Plants that were constructed by 
merchant firms and have always been merchant-owned cannot be analyzed in this way, because 
the plant fixed effects incorporate the merchant component. As a result, the second set of 
regressions for each labor decision attempts to identify an overall merchant effect separately 
from the divestiture effect; to do this, I use plant characteristics in lieu of plant fixed effects to 
analyze the choices of plants that are either divested or native merchant establishments in 
relation to utility plants. 
The basic approach is to use a log-linear model of the following form: 
(1)  ln(L ) = C + β legislation  + β divest  +φ plant  +α year  + e it  1  st  2  it i  i t  t it 
In this equation, Lit is one of the three labor decisions I am analyzing – end-of-year employment 
at the plant level, annual payroll at the plant level or annual payroll per employee at the plant 
level. Legislation is a dummy variable that equals one for states that ultimately enacted their own 
restructuring legislation, beginning the year that the state started formal hearings and divest is a 
dummy variable that equals one for plants that were divested, beginning the year that ownership 
transferred. Also included in the regression are plant and year fixed effects. 
For the employment analysis, I focus on end-of-year employment. The alternative is to 
use annual average employment, which overstates employment if there is a downward trend in 
staffing over the year. Conversely, if an establishment adds employees over the year, 
employment would be overstated by this measure. Since I am looking at the shift in employment 
over time, I have chosen to use December employment as the measure of employment for the 
41 Reasons for evaluating end-of-year rather than average employment are detailed below. Because of concerns 
about the potential peculiarities of December payroll, I consider annual payroll instead. 
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year so that the trend does not obscure the analysis. This also allows me to use fully the 
information contained in the most recent data available.  Additionally, I have excluded plants 
that have an end-of-year employment of zero from the sample in the year that the employment 
was reduced to this level. This eliminates employment fluctuations that result from closing the 
plant either permanently or temporarily. 
The data in this analysis are clearly autocorrelated. For the employment equation, the 
estimated rho is 0.642, indicating a high level of correlation. Total payroll has an estimated rho 
of 0.547. Average pay per employee is much less persistent, with an estimate rho of 0.192. In all 
three cases, the Durbin-Watson statistic supports the rejection of the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation at the 1% confidence level. 
To account for the serial correlation, each regression is run using OLS, with a variance 
correction using errors clustered at the plant level.
42 The regressions are also run using the Prais-
Winsten GLS correction. Although specific coefficient estimates change somewhat under GLS, 
the overall conclusions of the analysis do not change when this correction is implemented. 
Using OLS requires that changes in state-level restructuring legislation and plant-level 
ownership status be exogenous to changes in plant-level employment decisions. Looking at 
industry and regulatory documents as well as press accounts from the period that states were 
considering legislation, there is no cause to believe that high employment costs (either employee 
counts or payroll costs) were a primary driver of industry reform. Employment expenses are a 
relatively small share of the total cost of generating electricity, dwarfed by fuel and other costs.
43 
Because of this, I do not have reason to believe that employment was a target of restructuring 
legislation and so the exogeneity assumption is justified for this variable. As discussed above and 
demonstrated in Table 2, divestitures were also exogenous to plant-level employment and payroll 
expenses for this time period.  Utilities tended to divest either all or none of their capacity. Those 
that partially divested generation assets did so for reasons other than employment costs. 
The model is specified as log-linear, implying that there is a multiplicative effect of the 
independent variables. This is a reasonable assumption as we would expect the dummy variables 
to have a proportional effect on employment, payroll or average wage. We would expect a 
merchant generator to staff at some fraction of a utility generator, rather than that all merchants 
42 I use the cluster command in Stata, which is described in Arellano (1987). 

43 For 2004, I estimate labor expenses of $3.62 per MWh of net generation output. The average wholesale price for 

that year was about $39.40 per MWh (see Footnote 11). 
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employ, say, 5 fewer people. This specification also leads to a straightforward interpretation of 
the coefficients in the model. Coefficients on indicator variables, as we have in equation (1), can 
be easily transformed to reflect the percent differential for plants that exhibit the characteristic 
marked by the variable.
44 
The above technique sets forth the preferred approach to analyzing this type of data. 
Plant fixed effects are a useful way to control for the unobserved and idiosyncratic variables at 
the plant level. However, it is not wholly satisfactory as it fails to exploit a significant source of 
information. Since plants that were built by merchant companies were never anything other than 
merchant companies, using fixed effects leads to a failure to identify the effect of being a 
merchant plant unless the plant arrived at that state via divestiture.  In an attempt to utilize the 
data of native merchant plants, I also use observable plant characteristics in place of plant fixed 
effects.  Although this does not control for plant-level differences as completely, it is not an 
unreasonable approach. Power plants are relatively homogeneous as compared to other types of 
production facilities. A few general plant characteristics can account for much of the plant-level 
variation. 
To formulate a specification that can mimic plant fixed effects, it is necessary to 
determine the important characteristics of a plant vis-à-vis employment decisions.  From a 
theoretical perspective, plant capacity in megawatts (MW), age of the plant,
45 a measure of plant 
fuel efficiency (via the plant’s “heat rate”), and the type of generation technology
46 of the plant 
are clearly the primary characteristics that should have a significant effect on labor decisions. 
Since I am not certain precisely how these characteristics contribute to the determination of 
operating decisions, I consider a specification that is flexible regarding the roles played by the 
various characteristics. Specifically, capacity, fuel efficiency and plant age also enter the 
equation as higher order terms. State fixed effects are included as well. 
The regression that uses plant characteristics in lieu of plant fixed effects is: 
44 To arrive at the percent effect of a given characteristic, exponentiate the coefficient and subtract 1. To be concrete, 
β the divested plants have, on average, (  e
2  −1)*100% more (or fewer) employees than nondivested plants. The 

percent effects, calculated in this way, are presented along with the regression results in the output tables. 

45 Age is calculated using the year the oldest unit at the plant initially went online. 






    
 
 
   
 
       
   
 
   
  
     









                                                 
         
 
       
4 4 
ln( Lit ) = C + β1legislationst  + β2divest  it  + β3merchant  it  + ∑λ  j [ln(  capacity  it )] 
j + ∑γ j [ln(  ageit )] 
j 
j=1  j=1 (2) 
4 4 
+ ∑ω j [ln(min_ effit )] 
j + ∑η j [ln(max_ effit )] 
j  +θ ptechit  +φsstate  i +αt year  t  + eit 
j=1  j=1 
The variables in equation (2) that are common with equation (1) are as defined above.  The 
variables that replace the plant fixed effects of equation (1) are the log of plant nameplate 
capacity (capacity), the log of the time elapsed since plant online date (age), the log of the 
minimum fuel efficiency (min_eff) at the plant, the log of the maximum fuel efficiency (max_eff) 
at the plant
47, dummies for the plant’s generation technology (tech), a set of state fixed effects 
and a set of year fixed effects. Additionally, I include squares, cubes and quartics of the fuel 
efficiency, capacity and age variables. 
Equation (2) uses the log-linear specification for the same reasons given for its use in 
equation (1). The only difference is that here there are four continuous variables – minimum fuel 
efficiency, maximum fuel efficiency, capacity and age of the plant. While the interpretation of 
the dichotomous variables is unchanged, the interpretation of the log-linear coefficient of a 
continuous variable is simply the elasticity of the independent variable with respect to the 
dependent variable.
48 
Finally, I estimate the equations with a time trend variable in lieu of the divestiture 
variable. It is possible that divested plants were on a different employment path over time that 
was simply continued in the post-divestiture era. To evaluate the extent to which this is 
happening, I add a set of dummy variables that indicate where the plant is chronologically in the 
divestiture process. These variables are always equal to zero for plants that were never divested 
or are native merchant plants. For divested plants, they are separate dummy variables for each 
year before and after divestiture, starting with 5 years prior to divestiture and ending with 6 years 
after divestiture. For example, consider a plant that was divested in 1998. For this plant, the 
variable indicating 5 years pre-divestiture would correspond to the calendar year 1993, and 2004 
would be 6 years post-divestiture. The equation estimated is as follows: 
47 The efficiency metric used, heat rate, is a measure of how efficiently the plant can turn fuel into electricity. It is 
reported annually by unit, so when I aggregate to the plant level for this analysis I retain the fuel efficiency of both 
the most-efficient and the least-efficient unit at the plant. 
48 That is, β*100 is the percent change in plant employment (payroll or average wage) that follows a 1% change in 
(for example) megawatt capacity. 
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(3) ln(L ) = C + β legislation  +δ yr _ div  +φ plant  +α year + e it  1  st i  it i  i t  t it 
This is a modification of equation (1); variables that are common to the equations are as defined 
above. The new component of this equation is represented by yr_div, which should be interpreted 
as the set of annual dummy variables that describe the chronological position of the plant in the 
divestiture cycle. 
This equation is also estimated as a merchant-effect regression with plant characteristics 
replacing plant fixed effects. That equation is: 
4 4 
ln( Lit ) = C + β1legislationst + β3merchant  it +δ y yr _ div  it + ∑λ  j [ln(  capacity  it )] 
j + ∑γ j [ln(  ageit )] 
j 
j=1  j=1 (4) 
4 4 
+ ∑ω j [ln(min_ effit )] 
j + ∑η j [ln(max_ effit )] 
j +θ ptechit +φsstate  i +αt year  t + eit 
j=1  j=1 
Again, all of the variables in this equation have been defined above. I did not estimate the 
equations with a separate merchant time trend, as there is no reason to expect that the pattern of 
merchant plants differed from the pattern exhibited by non-merchant plants. Indeed, statistical 
tests indicate that a set of merchant time effects is not significant when estimated in conjunction 
with a set of overall time effects. 
V. Results 
A. Employment 
The first analysis I consider is that of employment, estimated using plant-level fixed 
effects.  I find that there is a large and significant effect of divestiture on employment. Data are 
clustered at the plant level in these regressions. 
Table 4 shows the results of the employment regressions. The first two columns 
(regressions I and II) show the employment regression as it is estimated with plant-level fixed 
effects, as in equation (1). Divestiture is the effect that can be estimated in these equations. 
Regression I illustrates OLS regressions that have been corrected for serial correlation by 
clustering observations at the plant level. Regression II is the GLS regression, which is estimated 
using the Prais-Winsten technique. According to the OLS estimates, divested plants in the 




















                                                 
         
     
   
accounting for the industry-wide decline in employment over this time period using year fixed 
effects. The effect estimated by the Prais-Winsten approach is somewhat more modest, although 
it still calculates a 28.2% percent reduction in employment at divested plants. Note that although 
the point estimates of the two approaches are different, there is significant overlap in the 95% 
confidence intervals of the estimates. Both estimates are significant at the 5% level or better; the 
effect is clearly negative and of substantial magnitude.
49 
Regressions III and IV shown in Table 4 are the OLS and GLS estimates of the 
employment regression specified in equation (2), which uses plant characteristics and state fixed 
effects in place of plant fixed effects. Although, as explained above, plant characteristics 
combined with state fixed effects are not perfect predictors of the plant-level effects, using this 
technique I can look at the experience of native merchant plants in addition to the plants that 
became merchants through divestiture.  
For the clustered OLS regressions, the conclusions of the plant characteristics regression 
are qualitatively similar to those of the divestiture-only regressions, though the effect is of a 
much larger magnitude. Merchant plants are estimated to have approximately 72.2% fewer 
employees, significant at the 5% level. This is a very large number. Notice that the standard error 
is relatively large as well, so the estimate should be interpreted cautiously. The estimate for 
divest in this equation is positive, although not significant. Since the two coefficients should be 
summed for the total effect on divested plants, these regressions suggest that the bulk of the 
decline in employment estimated in regressions I and II is due to the fact that the plants are 
owned and operated by merchants rather than that divestiture provided an incentive apart from 
this ownership incentive. 
The GLS regression estimates a slightly smaller merchant effect of -65.4%, which is 
significant at the 10% level. The effect of divestiture in this regression is positive, very large in 
magnitude and significant at the 10% level.  Taking into account standard errors, there is 
significant overlap in the 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and GLS estimates, so the results 
are not inconsistent. 
49 When the average of monthly employment over the year is used as the dependent variable rather than end of year 
employment, the coefficient on divest is closer to zero and still significantly different from zero. This is consistent 





     
     
       
   
   
 
   







   
   
 
 
   
     
   
The lack of significance (regression III) or borderline significance (regression IV) of the 
divest coefficient suggests that other utility-owned plants would likely experience a similar 
magnitude of employment reductions if they were divested to merchant firms. Note that since all 
divested plants are also merchant plants, the total effect of divestiture is the sum of the divest 
coefficient and the merchant coefficient. It is tempting to conclude from the large and positive 
coefficient on divest that it is not likely that divested plants will achieve the labor reductions of 
native merchant plants. However, the fact that the divest  coefficient is barely or not at all 
significantly different from zero implies that native merchant plants do not have significantly 
greater potential for efficiency gains with respect to labor than utility-built plants, over the 
approximately five-year time horizon of this study. 
Table 5 shows the results of employment equations (3) and (4), which use a set of annual 
divestiture fixed effects in place of the single time trend and the divest dummy.  These 
regressions indicate the evolution of the effect of divestiture on staffing decisions, rather than 
simply comparing the pre-divestiture average to the post-divestiture average employment. F 
statistics of the joint significance of the set of pre-divestiture dummies (5 years prior to 
divestiture through the year before divestiture) and the post-divestiture dummies (year of 
divestiture through 6 years after divestiture) are given below the list of coefficient estimates. 
These regressions also include generic year effects, which are not reported in this table, meaning 
that the yearly divestiture effects are in addition to the secular time trend. 
In the divestiture-effect regressions (regressions I and II of Table 5), it is clear by 
inspection that overall the pre-divestiture set of dummies is smaller in absolute magnitude than 
the post-divestiture variables. None of the years in the pre-divestiture era have a trend coefficient 
that is significantly different from zero. By contrast, plants had reduced employment by 
approximately 80% in the third year after divestiture, significant at the 1% level. Additionally, 
the F statistic shows that as a group the post-divestiture dummies have a higher level of 
significance than the pre-divestiture dummies. This is evidence that the significance of the divest 
variable in the previous set of regressions is not due solely to the continuation of an existing 
trend. While the estimates for years 5 and 6 post-divestiture could indicate the reversal of the 
trend, I hesitate to conclude too much from these estimates. They are based on a relatively small 
number of plants due to the fact that relatively few of the plants in the sample were divested 




   
 
 
   
   













   
                                                 
as more data become available; it is possible that the new owners underestimated the minimum 
number of employees required to staff a plant and there was a period of correction after the 
initial drop in employment. This would be consistent with what I was told by a union 
representative in 2004, who said that the merchant plants, after a period of broadening job titles 
and responsibilities were beginning to see the “wisdom” of narrower job titles and the higher 
staffing levels that implies. 
The merchant-effect regressions that include divestiture time effects (regressions III and 
IV in Table 5) again indicate that merchant ownership rather than divestiture is the key factor at 
work in the observed employment reduction. The effect of merchant ownership (which is 
additive to the divestiture effects) is estimated to be approximately -79.4% and is significant at 
the 1% level. As in the previous regressions, the effect of divestiture, when separated from the 
merchant component is positive and insignificant in the post-divestiture era. Note that some of 
these estimates imply extraordinarily large effects; before drawing a conclusion about this recall 
that the standard errors are again quite large, so the 95% confidence interval includes a 
reasonable range of values.  
Because of data limitations, this paper does not distinguish between a reduction in the 
total labor force and a shift of employment from in-house employees to contractors. While I do 
not have contracting data at the plant level, I do have some information on this point from the 
quinquennial Economic Census of Utilities and Transportation, albeit at the national level. In 
1992, the percent of Maintenance and Repair expenses that was incurred by direct employees 
was 58.3%. By 1997, this number had grown to 60.4% and in 2002 it was back down to 54.2%. 
In real dollar terms, the amount spent on outside work was 7.3% lower in 2002, relative to 
1997.
50 While this does not tell us the changes in the populations of interest (either by 
state/restructuring status or by merchant/utility ownership), it does indicate that there were not 
drastic industry-wide shifts in contracting practices over this time period. 
Although we should keep the above in mind, the analysis clearly shows that significant 
staffing reductions have occurred. Given the magnitude of the shift and the limited information 
that can be gleaned from the national data, this is unlikely to be solely the result of an 
outsourcing of labor. However, even if the difference shown here were completely attributable to 
contracting, it would be significant that the utility and merchant firms are behaving differentially. 
50 Economic Census (Utilities), 1992, 1997, 2002. 
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Presumably, merchant firms would not be contracting with outside labor sources if they could 
provide a permanent in-house labor force more cheaply. Thus, to conclude there is no difference 
in behavior requires that merchants are not able to hire workers as cheaply as utilities while the 
sources of contract labor can hire labor at those rates. This does not seem to be a plausible 
scenario, especially relative to the alternative hypothesis of differential incentives to cost-
minimize. 
Correcting the parameter estimates in both sets of equations for autocorrelation using 
Prais-Winsten GLS correction does not change the primary conclusion of the analysis – 
divestiture has an economically and statistically significant effect on employee counts at these 
plants. 
I was not able to identify an employment effect that was significantly correlated with 
state-level legislation in either the regressions with plant fixed effects or state fixed effects. 
Checks on the analysis that looked at divestitures and legislation separately did not indicate that 
this is a result of collinear variables – including legislation did not have much effect on the 
estimated merchant coefficient and vice versa.  Further, omitting merchant entirely did not have 
an appreciable effect on the estimated legislation coefficient; the reverse was also true. It is 
possible that because the pre-period of the sample with respect to legislation is relatively short,
51 
the legislation effect is incorporated into the state or plant fixed effects. Fabrizio, Rose and 
Wolfram (2006) identify a legislation efficiency effect for employee counts in the neighborhood 
of three percent. The period examined in their study, 1981 – 1999, is quite a bit earlier than my 
period, resulting in a much larger number of pre-restructuring observations. Additional factors 
for the difference could be that Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram cover all states, while this analysis 
covers a subset of states. 
These regressions were also run on coal plants. Results were qualitatively similar, 
although there were relatively few coal plants in the sample, which resulted in a lack of 
significance in the findings. Gas plants are a reasonable focus of the analysis as a higher share of 
gas plants was divested. Moreover, because of environmental and other concerns merchants 
tended to build gas plants over this time period. Because of relative fuel prices (and perhaps 
because of a decrease in the likelihood of opposition from environmental regulatory bodies, 
51 Recall that restructuring is defined by the beginning of formal hearings in the state. The first state, NY, began 








   
   
 
       
 
   
 






     
 
                                                 
 
 
either because of political clout or improved environmental efficiency of the plants), however, 
there is currently a resurgence in the construction of coal-fired plants,
52 so it may be worthwhile 
to extend the analysis to these plants in the future. 
B. Payroll per Employee 
From a broad perspective, the average wage in the generation industry increased 
dramatically during this period. While the CPI for this time period indicates a 45% overall 
increase in prices, workers in this industry saw their nominal wages increase by 85% between 
1990 and 2004. Table 6 considers the relative changes in payroll per employee for ownership and 
restructuring groups within the industry. Regressions I and II of Table 6, which are based on 
equation (1), indicate that the effect of divestiture on payroll per employee, when controlling for 
plant-level fixed effects, is modestly positive, though it is not significantly different from zero in 
either regression. As in the employment table, the first regression presents standard errors that 
are robust to serial correlation within plants. The second regression corrects both the standard 
error and the parameter estimate for first-order autocorrelation.  
Regressions III and IV of Table 6 estimate equation (2) and attempt to identify an effect 
for merchant plants that is separate from the divestiture effect of being a former-utility plant. The 
estimated merchant effect is much larger than the effect that was estimated for divested plants – 
OLS estimates that merchant plants pay employees approximately 50.4% more than non-
merchant plants when controlling for state effects and basic plant characteristics at the 5% 
significance level. The GLS correction yields a modestly smaller estimate of the effect of 
merchant ownership of 46.6%, significant at the 1% level. When identifying a general merchant 
effect, the coefficient on divest is negative and significant in both regressions, indicating that 
divested plants have lower payroll per employee than comparable native merchant plants. 
Adding the divest and merchant coefficients results in an estimate that is roughly in line with the 
divest coefficients of regressions I and II. 
One explanation for the relatively higher payroll per employee at merchant plants is that 
merchant owners have disproportionately reduced employment in lower-skill jobs. This is 
consistent with what I learned from union and industry managers, who told me that wages did 
not change much for the workers that remained in the industry, controlling for job title. An 
52 See, for example, the proposal by the unregulated generation affiliate of TXU to build 11 new coal-fired plants in 
Texas. 
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explanation was suggested by a manager at a merchant power plant, who told me that her firm 
has virtually eliminated apprenticeship programs.  She stated that since training is no longer in 
her budget she is now looking to hire fully trained personnel, a departure from utility practices. 
This assertion is corroborated by recent press reports, which state that generation companies 
have begun encouraging technical schools and colleges to offer degree programs to train power 
plant operations staff.
53 
The regressions in Table 7 of equations (3) and (4) that trace the evolution of payroll per 
employee at divested plants tell a similar story. Post-divestiture annual effects are positive and 
large in magnitude, though not generally significantly different from zero. Again, when 
decomposing the effect into a merchant effect and a divestiture effect, the merchant effect is 
estimated to be large and positive, exceeding 50%. In both the OLS and GLS regressions, the 
estimate is significant at the 5% level. At the same time, looking at the yearly divestiture effects 
in the estimate of equation (4), which is shown in columns III and IV, payroll per employee at 
divested plants fell significantly in the year of divestiture and recovered modestly, if at all, in 
subsequent years. There is a jump up in payroll per employee between years 5 and 6 after 
divestiture, but because of the thinness of the sample in that range I hesitate to conclude too 
much from that estimate. The test of joint significance reveals that the post-divestiture set of 
effects is significant as a group. The pre-divestiture effects are of borderline significance, to the 
extent that they are significant at all, indicating that the post-divestiture estimates are not simply 
the continuation of an existing trend. These results are particularly striking in the merchant-effect 
regressions. 
As with the employment equations, I do not find a significant relationship between the 
payroll per employee and whether the state in which the plant is located has enacted restructuring 
legislation. The estimate of the effect of restructuring is small, negative and statistically 
insignificant. Again, this may be because of the limited observations for the pre-restructuring 
period in these data. 
C. Payroll 
Aggregating the effect of merchant ownership on employment and payroll per employee, 
the establishment-level payroll regressions show that divested and merchant plants have 
significantly lower payroll expenses than utility plants. On a percentage basis, the reduction in 









   
   






   





payroll observed at these plants is generally somewhat less than the reduction in employment. 
This is consistent with the above observation that a decrease in employment based on employee 
counts is correlated with divestiture and merchant ownership, while the payroll per employee 
was unchanged or increased at these plants.  
The first two columns of Table 8 show the results of the estimation of equation (1) and 
indicate a large and significant decrease in total payroll costs per establishment. OLS estimates a 
decrease in payroll costs of about 32.3%, while the GLS estimate is -25.3%.  As in the previous 
analyses, these regressions use plant fixed effects to control for plant characteristics that do not 
vary across time.   
When looking at the overall effect of merchant ownership using the specification of 
equation (2), shown in the third and fourth regressions of Table 8, the relationship between 
payroll and merchant ownership is slightly less clear. Although the coefficient on merchant is 
large and negative in both regressions, as was the coefficient on divested in the regressions 
controlling for plant fixed effects, the standard deviation is much larger in the merchant 
regressions; as a result, the estimate is borderline statistically significant in regression III. The 
merchant estimate of regression IV is negative and strongly significant.  Again, in these 
regressions, the bulk of the effect of divestiture effect appears to be derived from the fact that 
these plants are run by merchant firms. In regression III, which decomposes merchant ownership 
and divestiture, it does not appear that divestiture has a differential effect apart from merchant 
ownership. However, regression IV shows that divestiture has a very large and significant 
additive effect to merchant payrolls. That is, divested merchant plants have higher payrolls than 
native merchant plants. The magnitude of the effect is quite large, although the large standard 
error indicates the magnitude of the effect may well be overstated. 
As with the employment and wage regressions, I evaluated equations (3) and (4) with 
establishment payroll as the dependent variable, using a separate time trend for divested plants. 
The results are reported in Table 9.  The post-divestiture effects reported here are clearly 
different from the pre-divestiture effects in these regressions, with their effects peaking in the 
fourth year after divestiture. They are, as a group, of greater magnitude than the pre-period 
estimates. As in the previous regressions, it is difficult to know whether the reversal of trend in 
years 5 and 6 is a result of a new strategy or if it is an artifact of the relatively small sample in 
later years.  As was the case with both employment and payroll per employee, the regressions 
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that use the plant characteristics instead of plant fixed effects demonstrate that the effects that I 
observe are largely due to the merchant aspect of divested plants, rather than due to the fact that 
divested plants have a greater potential for cost savings. In fact, it appears that divested plants 
have generally not been able to achieve the lower cost levels exhibited by other merchant plants. 
This may be because of legacy employment arrangements. 
VI. Conclusion 
From the results presented in this paper, it is clear that restructuring defined as the 
encouragement of new types of plant ownership had a large effect on labor costs in this industry. 
Merchant firms in the electricity generation industry responded to the stronger incentives 
provided by this type of ownership. Specifically, merchant firms have smaller staffs and lower 
overall payroll costs. There is also some evidence that payroll per employee is higher at 
merchant plants. This may reflect a change in the skill mix used at these plants.  
Divested plants follow a similar pattern, but when both a merchant and a divestiture 
effect are estimated, the merchant effect is the primary driver of the results. Plants that were 
divested from utilities and those that were built by merchant firms from the ground up exhibited 
large but only mildly significant differences in their abilities to reduce labor costs. This suggests 
that plants that were conceived, built and operated as merchant plants can achieve modestly 
better cost savings than plants that were built by utilities and then divested to merchant 
ownership. 
In this analysis, I do not find that restructuring defined as the passage of state-level 
restructuring legislation had a significant effect on plant employment or payroll costs. It is 
possible that using a time period with more data in the pre-legislation period could affect this 
conclusion. 
This analysis suggests that the movement toward liberalization and the use of market 
incentives can result in significant gains in productive efficiency. Over the 1990s, this industry 
was able to drastically reduce its labor force while expanding total output.  This is broadly 
consistent with other findings in the literature. While my analysis does not consider the 
performance of regulation in enhancing market competitiveness, it is clear that firms are 
responding to the opportunity to improve their profits by economizing when there is a reward for 
these efforts. From a productive efficiency perspective, these incentives appear to be working. 
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This paper does not explore the specific mechanisms by which employment and payroll 
costs were reduced at the merchant power plants. It also does not consider the long-run 
implication of these decisions, such as whether the plants that have reduced employment are 
engaging in a sustainable business strategy. These are issues that I will address in future work, as 
described below. 
With respect to the mechanism by which efficiencies are achieved, there are a number of 
strategies that generators might have implemented. One possibility is that training programs have 
been eliminated. The results presented here suggest that merchant firms may utilize a more 
highly-skilled labor force. The observed differences could indicate outsourcing of low-skill 
functions, such as janitorial services, or it could be the result of the elimination of training 
programs. It is also possible that some jobs have been eliminated entirely. Using publicly 
available Census data, I will evaluate the change in the labor mix during this time period to 
determine how employees of different education and experience levels were affected by 
restructuring. 
I will also analyze the long-run sustainability of the cost-cutting strategies employed by 
merchants. It has been suggested that the strategies I observe at the power plants are optimal 
given a short-term horizon. It is possible, therefore, that plants are maximizing short-run returns 
at the expense of the long-run survival of the plants. This may be because of uncertainty of future 
regulatory decisions or because of an inability to compete with regulated utilities in the long run. 
I will use data on operating efficiency, planned outages, unplanned (“forced”) outages and output 
decisions to assess whether merchant plants are being run more intensively than utility plants.  
A short-term strategy would indicate that revenue in future periods is highly discounted 
relative to near-term revenue, perhaps because of pessimism about the long-term prospects of the 
firm. This pessimism may be the result of regulatory uncertainty or a persistent competitive 
disadvantage relative to incumbent generators. Operators with a long-term decision horizon 
engage in ongoing plant maintenance and tend to run the plant within a moderate range of 
output. Excessive plant starts and prolonged operation of the plant outside a normal range of 
output contribute to early deterioration of plant equipment. As a result, plants that are being run 
to maximize short-term gains may exhibit fewer planned maintenance outages and more forced 
outages. They may also be run more frequently at suboptimal heat rates (a measure of plant fuel 
efficiency) and may be stopped and started more frequently.  
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Figure 1. Average Annual Wage, Electricity Generation Industry 
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Table 1. Generation (MWh) and Capacity (MW) of  

Merchant and Utility Generators, 1990-2003 

Generation (MWh)  Capacity (MW) 
Merchant Utility  Merchant  Utility 
1990  7.5% 92.5%  5.9%  94.1% 
1991  8.0% 92.0%  6.3%  93.7% 
1992  9.2% 90.8%  6.8%  93.2% 
1993  9.7% 90.3%  7.3%  92.7% 
1994  10.3% 89.7% 8.2% 91.8% 
1995  10.6% 89.4% 8.3% 91.7% 
1996  10.5% 89.5% 8.5% 91.5% 
1997  10.5% 89.5% 8.7% 91.3% 
1998  11.2% 88.8%  11.6%  88.4% 
1999  14.0% 86.0%  19.0%  81.0% 
2000  20.6% 79.4%  26.1%  73.9% 
2001  29.6% 70.4%  36.0%  64.0% 
2002  33.9% 66.1%  39.0%  61.0% 
2003  36.6% 63.4%  43.4%  56.6% 




   
 
              
                
                   
                
                           
                        
            
 
 
Table 2: Merchant Capacity (Gas), by State (2002)
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Source: EIA Capacity Tables (Gas Plants)
 
1States in sample that had divestitures over 500MW.
 
2IN, KY: Divestitures by companies with multi-state territories.
 
3LA: Single utility sold 100% of its generation assets.
 
4TX: Divestitures resulted from:
 
1) merger of AEP and CSW. 
2) transfer of Texas Utilities Electric Co assets to
  an unregulated subsidiary. 
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observations  2,337 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
                              
Table 4. Results of Employment Equations 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(employ)  ln(employ)  ln(employ)  ln(employ) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant  plant  state  state 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  -0.020 
(0.074) 
-2.0%  0.010 
(0.036) 
1.0%  0.048 
(0.128) 
4.9%  -0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.4% 
divest  -0.552 ** 
(0.249) 
-42.4%  -0.331 *** 
(0.126) 
-28.2%  0.607 
(0.641) 
83.5%  1.010 * 
(0.597) 
174.6% 
merchant  -1.279 ** 
(0.622) 
-72.2%  -1.062 * 
(0.605) 
-65.4% 
1991  0.049 
(0.044) 
5.0%  0.023 
(0.030) 
2.4%  -0.207  *** 
(0.087) 
-18.7%  -0.011 
(0.033) 
-1.1% 
1992  0.066 
(0.054) 
6.8%  0.031 
(0.036) 
3.2%  -0.154  * 
(0.082) 
-14.3%  -0.005 
(0.034) 
-0.5% 
1993  0.061 
(0.061) 
6.3%  0.041 
(0.045) 
4.2%  -0.130 
(0.086) 
-12.2%  0.003 
(0.047) 
0.3% 
1994  0.045 
(0.061) 
4.6%  0.028 
(0.052) 
2.8%  -0.111 
(0.088) 
-10.5%  -0.029 
(0.056) 
-2.8% 
1995  0.027 
(0.066) 
2.7%  -0.014 
(0.062) 
-1.4%  -0.134 
(0.108) 
-12.6%  -0.077 
(0.067) 
-7.4% 
1996  -0.019 
(0.071) 
-1.9%  -0.056 
(0.065) 
-5.5%  -0.211 * 
(0.120) 
-19.1%  -0.133 * 
(0.075) 
-12.5% 
1997  -0.040 
(0.079) 
-3.9%  -0.085 
(0.075) 
-8.2%  -0.224 * 
(0.135) 
-20.1%  -0.159 * 
(0.084) 
-14.7% 
1998  0.010 
(0.078) 
1.0%  -0.047 
(0.074) 
-4.6%  -0.142 
(0.145) 
-13.2%  -0.146 
(0.089) 
-13.6% 





-6.3%  -0.153 
(0.158) 
-14.2%  -0.190  * 
(0.100) 
-17.3% 
2000  -0.051 
(0.084) 
-5.0%  -0.106 
(0.081) 
-10.1%  -0.144 
(0.164) 
-13.4%  -0.210  * 
(0.114) 
-18.9% 
2001  -0.084 
(0.089) 
-8.1%  -0.160 * 
(0.088) 
-14.8%  -0.091 
(0.171) 
-8.7%  -0.272 * 
(0.149) 
-23.8% 
2002  -0.092 
(0.091) 
-8.8%  -0.201 ** 
(0.092) 
-18.2%  0.038 
(0.186) 
3.9%  -0.357 ** 
(0.172) 
-30.0% 
2003  -0.044 
(0.088) 
-4.3%  -0.168 * 
(0.089) 
-15.4%  0.162 
(0.187) 
17.6%  -0.360 ** 
(0.175) 
-30.2% 
2004  -0.024 
(0.091) 
-2.4%  -0.146 
(0.090) 
-13.6%  0.088 
(0.202) 
9.2%  -0.372  ** 
(0.181) 
-31.1% 








R-Squared  0.90 0.79  0.62 0.38 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level. 
Standard Errors in ( ) below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 5. Results of Employment Equations, Divestiture Time Trends 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(employ)  ln(employ)  ln(employ)  ln(employ) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant, year  plant, year  state, year  state, year 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  -0.001 
(0.076) 
-0.1%  0.023 
(0.044) 
2.3%  0.175 
(0.136) 










divest minus 5  -0.094 
(0.151) 
-9.0%  -0.039 
(0.075) 
-3.8%  -0.565 *** 
(0.216) 
-43.2%  -0.114 ** 
(0.056) 
-10.8% 
divest minus 4  -0.128 
(0.167) 
-12.0%  -0.042 
(0.112) 
-4.1%  -0.564 *** 
(0.208) 
-43.1%  -0.154 * 
(0.079) 
-14.2% 
divest minus 3  -0.071 
(0.262) 
-6.8%  -0.066 
(0.210) 
-6.3%  -0.444  * 
(0.225) 
-35.9%  -0.060 
(0.085) 
-5.8% 













divest minus 1  -0.091 
(0.244) 
-8.7%  -0.093 
(0.206) 
-8.9%  -0.567  ** 
(0.247) 
-43.3%  -0.164 
(0.145) 
-15.1% 
divest  -0.178 
(0.294) 
-16.3%  -0.189 
(0.242) 
-17.2%  0.875 
(0.616) 
139.9%  1.352  ** 
(0.528) 
286.5% 
divest plus 1  -0.177 
(0.307) 
-16.2%  -0.173 
(0.258) 
-15.8%  0.960 
(0.597) 
161.1%  1.451  *** 
(0.520) 
326.7% 













divest plus 3  -1.664 *** 
(0.574) 
-81.1%  -1.509 *** 
(0.491) 
-77.9%  -0.223 
(0.783) 
-20.0%  0.370 
(0.697) 
44.8% 
divest plus 4  -2.150 *** 
(0.774) 
-88.4%  -2.263 *** 
(0.669) 
-89.6%  -0.076 
(0.942) 
-7.3%  -0.301 
(0.851) 
-26.0% 
divest plus 5  -0.397 
(0.470) 
-32.8%  -0.865 
(0.602) 
-57.9%  1.184 
(0.740) 
226.7%  -0.193 
(0.868) 
-17.6% 





















F-Stat,  pre-divest  1.58  2.26 **  3.00 **  5.09 *** 
F-Stat, post-divest  4.02  ***  3.38  ***  3.93  ***  4.99  *** 
R-Squared  0.91 0.82  0.64 0.47 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level 
Standard Errors in ( ) below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 6. Results of Payroll per Employee Equations 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant  plant  state  state 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  0.012 
(0.028) 
1.2%  0.011 
(0.026) 
1.1%  -0.029 
(0.036) 
-2.9%  -0.023 
(0.022) 
-2.3% 
divest  0.047 
(0.054) 
4.8%  0.036 
(0.052) 
3.7%  -0.336  * 
(0.177) 
-28.5%  -0.393  ** 
(0.163) 
-32.5% 
merchant  0.408 ** 
(0.171) 
50.4%  0.382 *** 
(0.145) 
46.6% 
1991  0.021 
(0.024) 
2.2%  0.027 
(0.020) 
2.7%  0.032 
(0.031) 
3.2%  0.035  ** 
(0.016) 
3.6% 
1992  0.079 *** 
(0.018) 
8.2%  0.083 *** 
(0.018) 
8.7%  0.087  *** 
(0.022) 
9.1%  0.067 *** 
(0.021) 
7.0% 
1993  0.102 *** 
(0.025) 
10.8%  0.109 *** 
(0.024) 
11.5%  0.106  *** 
(0.034) 
11.1%  0.103 *** 
(0.027) 
10.9% 
1994  0.178 *** 
(0.027) 
19.5%  0.184 *** 
(0.026) 
20.2%  0.196  *** 
(0.034) 
21.7%  0.193 *** 
(0.031) 
21.2% 
1995  0.189 *** 
(0.032) 
20.8%  0.192 *** 
(0.030) 
21.2%  0.215  *** 
(0.041) 
24.0%  0.207 *** 
(0.037) 
22.9% 
1996  0.222 *** 
(0.035) 
24.8%  0.227 *** 
(0.033) 
25.5%  0.242  *** 
(0.045) 
27.4%  0.235 *** 
(0.043) 
26.5% 
1997  0.257 *** 
(0.039) 
29.3%  0.264 *** 
(0.038) 
30.2%  0.268  *** 
(0.055) 
30.7%  0.266 *** 
(0.049) 
30.5% 
1998  0.330 *** 
(0.039) 
39.1%  0.335 *** 
(0.037) 
39.7%  0.338  *** 
(0.054) 
40.2%  0.343 *** 
(0.049) 
40.9% 
1999  0.323 *** 
(0.040) 
38.1%  0.325 *** 
(0.038) 
38.5%  0.345  *** 
(0.057) 
41.2%  0.349 *** 
(0.051) 
41.7% 
2000  0.362 *** 
(0.040) 
43.6%  0.364 *** 
(0.039) 
43.9%  0.377 *** 
(0.058) 
45.8%  0.397 *** 
(0.050) 
48.7% 
2001  0.396 *** 
(0.042) 
48.6%  0.401 *** 
(0.041) 
49.4%  0.432  *** 
(0.057) 
54.1%  0.462 *** 
(0.050) 
58.7% 
2002  0.449 *** 
(0.046) 
56.7%  0.461 *** 
(0.045) 
58.6%  0.457  *** 
(0.060) 
57.9%  0.513 *** 
(0.054) 
67.0% 
2003  0.509 *** 
(0.043) 
66.3%  0.516 *** 
(0.041) 
67.6%  0.506  *** 
(0.065) 
65.9%  0.568 *** 
(0.061) 
76.4% 
2004  0.555 *** 
(0.042) 
74.3%  0.567 *** 
(0.041) 
76.2%  0.545  *** 
(0.065) 
72.5%  0.598 *** 
(0.060) 
81.8% 








R-Squared  0.80 0.92  0.75  0.99 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level 
Standard Errors in ( ) below coefficient estimates. 
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  Table 7. Results of Payroll per Employee Equations, Divestiture Time Trends 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay)  ln(avg_pay) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant, year  plant, year  state, year  state, year 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  0.004 
(0.030) 
0.4%  0.004 
(0.028) 
0.4%  -0.040 
(0.037) 
-3.9%  -0.025 
(0.024) 
-2.5% 
merchant  0.439 ** 
(0.175) 
55.2%  0.431 *** 
(0.152) 
53.9% 
divest minus 5  -0.002 
(0.039) 
-0.2%  -0.009 
(0.034) 
-0.9%  -0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.4%  -0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.7% 
divest minus 4  0.052 
(0.044) 
5.4%  0.049 
(0.043) 
5.1%  0.054 
(0.044) 
5.6%  0.048 
(0.031) 
4.9% 
divest minus 3  0.030 
(0.042) 
3.0%  0.031 
(0.042) 
3.2%  0.044 
(0.038) 
4.5%  0.026 
(0.028) 
2.6% 
divest minus 2  0.075 
(0.049) 
7.8%  0.074 
(0.049) 
7.7%  0.075  * 
0.041 
7.8%  0.038 
(0.033) 
3.9% 
divest minus 1  0.055 
(0.051) 
5.6%  0.040 
(0.054) 
4.1%  0.068 
(0.047) 
7.1%  -0.003 
(0.042) 
-0.3% 
divest  -0.065 
(0.110) 
-6.3%  -0.062 
(0.108) 
-6.1%  -0.415 ** 
(0.171) 
-34.0%  -0.495 *** 
(0.172) 
-39.1% 
divest plus 1  0.094 
(0.065) 
9.9%  0.091 
(0.066) 
9.5%  -0.273 
(0.180) 
-23.9%  -0.409  ** 
(0.198) 
-33.5% 













divest plus 3  0.212 
(0.221) 
23.7%  0.215 
(0.222) 
24.0%  -0.135 
(0.193) 
-12.6%  -0.138 
(0.190) 
-12.9% 
divest plus 4  0.172 
(0.110) 
18.8%  0.140 
(0.124) 
15.1%  -0.282 
(0.182) 
-24.6%  -0.209 
(0.186) 
-18.9% 













divest plus 6  -0.098 
(0.091) 
-9.3%  -0.076 
(0.099) 
-7.3%  -0.112 
(0.178) 
-10.6%  -0.044 
(0.185) 
-4.3% 








F-Stat,  pre-divest  1.90 *  2.35 **  1.29  1.21 
F-Stat, post-divest  5.77  ***  6.09  ***  9.97  ***  9.06  *** 
R-Squared  0.80 0.92  0.75 0.99 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level 




     
   
 









     
     
                           
 
 
  Table 8. Results of Payroll per Establishment Equations 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant  plant  state  state 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  0.003 
(0.071) 
0.3%  0.024 
(0.045) 
2.4%  0.014 
(0.118) 
1.4%  0.007 
(0.028) 
0.7% 
divest  -0.389  ** 
(0.192) 
-32.3%  -0.292 ** 
(0.126) 
-25.3%  0.383 
(0.611) 
46.7%  1.245 *** 
(0.456) 
247.4% 
merchant  -0.961 * 
(0.575) 
-61.8%  -1.347 *** 
(0.466) 
-74.0% 
1991  0.080 
(0.057) 
8.3%  0.080 ** 
(0.038) 
8.3%  -0.172 * 
(0.094) 
-15.8%  0.021 
(0.027) 
2.1% 
1992  0.169 *** 
(0.054) 
18.4%  0.157  *** 
(0.048) 
17.0%  -0.078 
(0.082) 
-7.5%  0.038 
(0.042) 
3.8% 
1993  0.190 *** 
(0.058) 
20.9%  0.196 *** 
(0.052) 
21.6%  -0.027 
(0.084) 
-2.7%  0.099 ** 
(0.044) 
10.4% 
1994  0.274 *** 
(0.060) 
31.5%  0.276 *** 
(0.056) 
31.8%  0.087 
(0.080) 
9.1%  0.163 *** 
(0.057) 
17.7% 
1995  0.269 *** 
(0.055) 
30.9%  0.250 *** 
(0.057) 
28.4%  0.080 
(0.094) 
8.3%  0.149 *** 
(0.064) 
16.1% 
1996  0.241 *** 
(0.063) 
27.3%  0.237 *** 
(0.063) 
26.8%  0.046 
(0.108) 
4.7%  0.153 ** 
(0.074) 
16.6% 
1997  0.244 *** 
(0.065) 
27.7%  0.236  *** 
(0.065) 
26.6%  0.035 
(0.121) 
3.5%  0.135 
(0.088) 
14.4% 
1998  0.346 *** 
(0.065) 
41.4%  0.321 *** 
(0.069) 
37.8%  0.178 
(0.125) 
19.5%  0.225 ** 
(0.098) 
25.3% 
1999  0.334 *** 
(0.073) 
39.7%  0.307 *** 
(0.077) 
36.0%  0.190 
(0.143) 
21.0%  0.227 ** 
(0.110) 
25.5% 
2000  0.354 *** 
(0.077) 
42.4%  0.335 *** 
(0.081) 
39.8%  0.218 
(0.166) 
24.4%  0.276 ** 
(0.122) 
31.8% 
2001  0.388 *** 
(0.077) 
47.4%  0.372 *** 
(0.082) 
45.1%  0.389 *** 
(0.148) 
47.6%  0.358 *** 
(0.134) 
43.0% 
2002  0.395 *** 
(0.091) 
48.5%  0.381 *** 
(0.096) 
46.4%  0.498 *** 
(0.174) 
64.5%  0.365 ** 
(0.165) 
44.0% 
2003  0.517 *** 
(0.075) 
67.8%  0.477 *** 
(0.086) 
61.1%  0.656 *** 
(0.174) 
92.8%  0.438 ** 
(0.172) 
55.0% 
2004  0.578 *** 
(0.081) 
78.2%  0.549 *** 
(0.086) 
73.2%  0.633 *** 
(0.191) 
88.3%  0.477 *** 
(0.180) 
61.1% 
Constant  10.316 *** 
(0.081) 






R-Squared  0.90 0.96  0.71  0.95 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level 
Standard Errors in ( ) below coefficient estimates. 
45
  
   
   








   
                              
 
 
  Table 9. Results of Payroll per Establishment Equations, Divestiture Time Trends 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll)  ln(payroll) 
Correlation Correction  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant)  cluster(plant)  prais, cluster(plant) 
Fixed Effects  plant, year  plant, year  state, year  state, year 
Fuel Type  gas  gas  gas  gas 
Plant Characteristics  yes  yes 
estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect  estimate  % effect 
legislation  0.023 
(0.076) 
2.3%  0.044 
(0.052) 
4.5%  0.137 
(0.127) 
14.7%  0.039 
(0.034) 
3.9% 
merchant  -1.218 ** 
(0.539) 
-70.4%  -1.512 *** 
(0.441) 
-78.0% 
divest minus 5  -0.129 
(0.148) 
-12.1%  -0.108 
(0.074) 
-10.2%  -0.554 *** 
(0.207) 
-42.6%  -0.144 * 
(0.076) 
-13.4% 
divest minus 4  -0.109 
(0.157) 
-10.3%  -0.075 
(0.107) 
-7.2%  -0.526  ** 
(0.218) 
-40.9%  -0.161 
(0.112) 
-14.9% 













divest minus 2  -0.103 
(0.212) 
-9.8%  -0.128 
(0.169) 
-12.0%  -0.462  ** 
(0.225) 
-37.0%  -0.200 
(0.128) 
-18.1% 
divest minus 1  -0.188 
(0.220) 
-17.1%  -0.236 
(0.182) 
-21.0%  -0.576 ** 
(0.245) 
















divest plus 1  -0.189 
(0.266) 
-17.2%  -0.199 
(0.232) 
-18.0%  0.639 
(0.568) 
89.4%  1.287  *** 
(0.463) 
262.2% 
divest plus 2  -0.357 
(0.290) 
-30.0%  -0.331 
(0.256) 
-28.2%  0.218 
(0.664) 
24.4%  1.260  *** 
(0.478) 
252.4% 
divest plus 3  -1.047 ** 
(0.520) 
-64.9%  -0.957 ** 
(0.481) 
-61.6%  0.261 
(0.613) 
29.8%  1.235 *** 
(0.470) 
243.9% 
divest plus 4  -1.648 ** 
(0.667) 
-80.8%  -1.688 *** 
(0.628) 
-81.5%  -0.143 
(0.852) 
-13.3%  0.637 
(0.701) 
89.1% 
divest plus 5  -0.311 
(0.296) 
-26.7%  -0.658 
(0.413) 
-48.2%  0.743 
(0.726) 
110.3%  0.647 
(0.704) 
91.0% 
divest plus 6  -0.012 
(0.483) 
-1.2%  -0.278 
0.457 
-24.2%  1.807 *** 
(0.660) 












F-Stat,  pre-divest  1.16  2.94 **  2.12 *  1.70 
F-Stat, post-divest  7.81  ***  2.43  **  6.88  ***  3.75  *** 
R-Squared  0.91 0.96  0.72 0.95 
Observations  2,337  2,337  1,084  1,084 
Significant at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***) level 
Standard Errors in ( ) below coefficient estimates. 
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